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is amathematical approach to study collective decisionͲmaking situations inwhich the decision






relationsbetweendifferent stakeholders in the implementationof value capturingand suggesting
thebestpossiblestrategyforeverystakeholder;butalsoobservingthelimitationsofthemethodsin





valuecanbecaptured?),agovernanceor instrumentalistpointofview (which instrumentscanbe
effectiveforvaluecapturing?),orapoliticalpointofview(towhombelongstheincrementvaluethat
is the result of government investments or decisions?); this paper emphasizes an alternative
perspective, namely the decisionͲmaking or negotiation process of value capturing by relying on
gameͲtheoreticalapproach.
4.1 Introduction: Public Infrastructure Financing and Value
Capturing
The financing of public infrastructure as a necessary condition for urban development
projectshaslongbeensubjectofmanydebatesanddiscussions.Mainly,theproblemhasemerged






mainly based on tax revenues – in providing and develop all desired infrastructures.With the
increaseofinfrastructurescaleanddemand,thereisanecessityforagreatercollaborationbetween






land andproperty value  that resulted from the implementationof specialpublic improvements,
land use change or any other actions attributed to the public effort are recouped by the public
sectorandusedforpublicpurposes(Brown&Smolka,1997;Larietal.,2009).Alongtraditionexists
consideringvaluecapturingasatoolforpublicinfrastructureinvestment.Meanwhile,manystudies
have been carried outwith respect to value capturing (for instance, The RICS PolicyUnit (2004)
compileda reviewof the literatureon relationofpublic transportand landvalues).A substantial
part of this literature is aimed at providing the empirical evidence of land and property value
increasesassociatedwith the improvementof transportation infrastructure,especially rail transit,
and theassociated increasedaccessibilityof the location  (seee.g:AlͲMosaindetal.,1993;Diaz,
1999;Ryan,1999). Andyet inpractice,themethod isstillnoteasytobe implemented.Thereare
only few sources thatexplain thedecisionmakingprocesswith respect to the implementationof
valuecapturing.Thiscouldleadtothequestionwhethervaluecapturingmightbeafeasiblemethod
tocoͲfinanceinfrastructuredevelopment.
One of the difficulties in implementing value capturing is related to the technique to
determine theexactamountof incrementvalueof landandpropertiesdirectlyresulting from the
futureimprovementoftheinfrastructureservicelevel.Butperhapsthemoreimperativedifficulties
arise from the fact that value capturing, like any other common alternative resources of public
funding,usually involves the introductionof fiscal interventionssuchas taxes, fees,exactionsand
charges (see e.g. Higginson, 1999; Batt, 2001; Gihring, 2001). The introduction of new fiscal
programsmayoftenbereceivedwithgreatscepticismfromthepublic.Moreover,proposalsforthis
kindoffiscalinnovationsoftenlacksufficientpoliticalsupport.Asaresult,landandpropertyowners
inmanycountrieshavea legalrighttoenjoythe (majorpartofthe) incrementvalueoftheir land
andpropertieswithoutanyobligation to return it to thepublic,as for instance is thecase in the
Netherlands (Gielen, 2008).19 Consequently, the decision of the land and property owners to
contributetothefinancingofinfrastructuredevelopmentbygivingup(partof)theincrementvalue
becomesdependentupon theprofitabilityofsuchadecision for them. Inaddition to that,sucha
decisionalsoentailsinterdependencybetweentheprivateandpublicstakeholdersthatareinvolved
inthe implementationprocessofvaluecapturing.Anattempttounderstandthis interdependency
and theway it canbeorganisedand influencedmight thereforebe thekey toamore successful
implementation of value capturing, and conceivably, publicͲprivate financing of infrastructure
developmentingeneral.






In this paper,we offer a theoretical exploration of the interaction and interdependency
among actors involved in the implementation of value capturing, by relying on concepts and
approachesdrawnfromgametheory.Theobjectiveofthepaperistherefore–apartfromimproving
ourunderstandingof interdependencyofmainstakeholders invaluecapturing–to investigatethe
usefulnessaswellas the limitationsofgame theoreticalmodelling foranalyzing thebehaviourof
actors involved in decisionͲmaking processeswith respect to land and property development in







game theoreticalanalysisand theusefulnessofgame theory formodelling the implementationof
value capturing. Finally, section 4.5 provides some conclusions and suggests steps for further
research.
4.2 GameǦTheoreticalModelling
Game theory is amathematical approach to study social interactions (Myerson, 1991). It
focuses on collective decisionͲmaking situations in which the decision makers involved have
conflictingpreferences. Its focuson the conflictingpreferenceshasbecame the reason for some
expertstodescribegametheoryasaconflicttheory(Luce&Raiffa,1957;Myerson,1991).Aumann
(1989) even proposes to speak of InteractiveDecision Theory instead ofGame Theory, since the
formerdefinitionmoreaccuratelydescribesthecontentofthetheory.
The interdependencyof conflictingdecisionͲmakingbehaviour is an importantelement in
game theory.This interdependencymakes that theoutcomeofagamecannotbedeterminedby
onlyoneactor.Thus,theoutcomemustbeconsideredasacollectivedecision.Consequently,each
actortriestoexaminewhatstrategiestheotheractorscouldperformandwilladjusthisorherown
choice of action based on the expected actions of the others.Only by doing this, an actor can
optimizehisorherexpectedvalueoftheoutcomeor,ingametheoreticalterm,thepayoff.
Anotherimportantelementingametheoryisthenotionofrationalityofindividualdecision
makers,whichmeans that theyalways try tomaximize theirexpectedutilities.Tomodel rational
individualdecisionmaking,VonNeumann&Morgenstern,intheirseminalbook(1944),formulated
the soͲcalled expected utility theory which essentially is a theory of individual structures of
satisfaction related to a particular outcome produced by a certain decision. In the further
developmentofgametheory,theconceptofpayoffhasbeenintroducedinsteadofexpectedutility.
With this notion of rationality, game theory provides a simulation of individual’s interestͲbased






which players compete and make decisions independently although their strategies and the
outcomesofthosestrategiesareinterdependenttooneanother.20






Theplayers inagameare thedecisionmakers.Aplayer isaprimitive termand canonly
receiveameaninginanempiricalsetting.Inthisstudy,playersareinterpretedasactorsinvolvedin
theimplementationofvaluecapturing inlandandpropertydevelopment.Aplayerisassumedasa
unitaryactor thatmakesdecisionsas if it isone singledecisionbody (i.e. themunicipalityor the
transportcompanycanbeconsideredasaplayers).
Astrategy isacompleteplanofactionswhichdefineswhataplayermightdo inanygiven
situation during the game (Colman, 1999). There is a similarity between a strategy in game





but the result foreachplayer ispartlydependenton the choiceof theotherplayer.Thisgivesa
strongnotionofinterdependencyingametheory.
The third element in game theory is payoff. A payoff can be defined as the numbers
associatedwitheachpossibleoutcome resulting fromacompletesetofstrategicselectionsbyall
theplayers inagame (Colman,1999).Higherpayoffnumbersareattached tooutcomes thatare
valuedhigher inaplayer’sratingsystem.Themainassumption ingametheory isthateachplayer
attemptstoachieveashighapayoffforhimorherselfaspossibleinagame.Itisimportanttomake
acleardistinctionbetweentheconceptsofoutcomeandpayoff.Anoutcomeisasocialorphysical
statewhichmayresult from thebehaviourby individuals in thegame. In fact, it is thedecision, if
any,arrivedatbytheplayerscollectively.Thepayoffofanoutcomeforaplayeristhevalueofthat




over the outcomes. The individual payoff functions that assign values to outcomes vary across
individuals.What the best outcome is for one playermay be theworst for the other. The basic
questionthereforeishowtosolvegamesgiventhesedifferentpayofffunctions.
                                                 
20GametheorycanbedistinguishedintocooperativeandnonͲcooperative.Agameiscalledcooperativewhen
players can make binding agreements and nonͲcooperative when there is no possibility of doing so.
Cooperativegamesmainlydealwiththesituation inwhichgroupsorcoalitionsofplayersmakedecision






Themost simple and commonway to represent those three elements especially in nonͲ
cooperative game, is touse a strategy formwith amatrix that containspayoffs for anypossible
strategiesforeveryplayer.Inthismatrix,theinterdependentcharacteroftheplayers’interactionis
manifest.
The constructionof a gamebasedon those three elements in the formofpayoffmatrix
attempts to describe the strategic situation under scrutiny. It is however only one part of game
theory.Theotherpartistoinvestigateandpredicttheoutcomesgiventhedescriptionofthegame.









4.3 GameǦTheoretical Analysis of Value Capturing: A Conceptual
Approach
Inthissectionweconsiderlandandpropertydevelopmentprocessesinwhichacontribution
of the landowner to the costs of public investments in infrastructure is negotiated between the
municipality and the landowner. Concerning the analysis of value capturing strategies, a game
theoretical approachmight offer some advantages. First, it can be used to study stakeholders’
interactionsandtheirinterͲrelateddecisionbehaviourintheimplementationofvaluecapturing.The
gamemightgivean insight intohowstakeholdersbehavestrategically indecidinghow toachieve
thebestoutcome. Secondly,the implementationofvaluecapturing, inessence, istheresultofan
agreement among several stakeholders to contribute to the costs of public infrastructure
development.Bothformingandmanaginganagreementistheresultofcollectiveactions.Focusing
on collective actions, game theory iswellͲsuited to study the implementationof value capturing.






the stakeholders involved act on their selfͲinterest. In this situation, although each stakeholder
makes a decision independently, the outcome of the stakeholders’ actions cannot be decided
individuallyanditdependsontheparticularactionsordecisionstakenbyallstakeholderstogether.
Consequently, each stakeholderhas to take into account the expectationofwhat theothers are
doinginmakinghisorherdecision.







there is no dispute about its exact amount.Wewould argue here that the discussion of value
capturing implementationwillnotbebrought to the table if the increment value is stillunclear.
Furthermore, in this illustration, it isassumed thatboth the locationof thedevelopmentand the
partiesinvolvedareclearforallstakeholders,inordertoavoidaboundarydisputeoverwhichparty
shouldbe includedornot in thevaluecapturing.Weassume that, for themunicipality, thevalue
thatcanbecaptured is‘substantial’(without it,themunicipalitywillfacesubstantialdeficits inthe
budget).Forthelandowner,thecontributionisalso‘substantial’(however,thecontributionwillnot
bring him into insurmountable financial problems). Furthermore, we assume that no legislation
existsthatobliges landownerstocontribute.The implementationprocessesofvaluecapturingare
expectedtobetheresultofstrategicdecisionsofboththepublicinfrastructuredeveloper(usuallya
government institution,e.g.municipality),with respect to thedevelopmentof the infrastructure,
andthelandowner(s),withrespecttothefinancialcontributiontothenecessaryinvestmentsforthe
infrastructuredevelopment.Hence, the gameͲtheoretical analyses aim atmodelling thedecisionͲ
makingprocessesofbothparties.
To analyse the implementation of value capturing, first we consider two different
hypotheticalsituations,firstwithtwoplayers–themunicipalityandalandowner–asabasicmodel
of the analysis and second with three players by adding one more landowner to the game,
representingthemorecomplicatedsituationswithmultipleplayers,whichareoftencallednͲperson
games.Inthesegames,themunicipality(M)istheincrementvaluecreatorandthelandowner(L)is
the incrementvaluereceiver.Supposethedevelopmentof infrastructurewill increasethevalueof
land and property by a rate of ʌ. Itmeans that if the land has a total initial value of x, the
developmentof the infrastructurewill give the landowner an additional valueof  ʌxwhich then
creates a total valueorpayoffof x +ʌxor x(1 +ʌ) for the landowner. There are two strategies
available to the landowner, which are to contribute and not contribute to the infrastructure
development.At thesame time, themunicipalityalsohas twooptions: tobuildandnotbuild the
infrastructure.Valuecapturingisimplementedifonlyifthelandowneragreestogivetheincrement





(b) The municipality will build the infrastructure without the contribution from the
landowner,butitstillexpectsthecontributionafterwards.







Contribute x, ȡx x, 0 











Contribute x, ȡx x, 0 
Notcontribute x(1 + ȡ), 0 x, 0 
Fig.4.2TwoͲpersonvaluecapturinggameforsituation(b)
Inbothmodels,the{contribute,notbuild}strategyisremovedbecauseitisveryunlikelyfor




eachplayer’sbest response strategy. In (a), theNashequilibriumcanbe found in two strategies:









as a basic model of a multiple player game for value capturing. In these 3Ͳperson games, an





game instead of the four thatwere found in the gamewith two players. The gameͲtheoretical
modelsofthreeplayersforbothsituation(a)and(b)aregiveninFig.4.3and4.4respectively.Asin
thepreviousgames, the strategies inwhichone landownerorboth landownerscontribute to the
infrastructure developmentwhen themunicipality decides not to build it, is removed from the
game;aswellasthestrategies inwhichthemunicipalitybuildthe infrastructurewhilenoneofthe
landowners contributes. The latter is applied only in situation (a)where themunicipality cannot
buildtheinfrastructurewithoutacontributionfromthelandowner.
TheNashequilibriumofthesetwogamesarenotallthesameasinthegameswith
twoplayers. Insituation(a),theNashequilibrium isonlyfound inthe{notcontribute,not
contribute, not build} strategy whichmeans that the strategy not to contribute to the
infrastructuredevelopmentisapurestrategythatshouldbechosenbyallthelandowners,



















Contribute x, y, ȡ(x + y) x, y, 0 
Not






Contribute x(1 + ȡ), y, ȡy x, y, 0 
Not












Contribute x, y, ȡ(x + y) x, y, 0 
Not






Contribute x(1 + ȡ), y, ȡy x, y, 0 
Not
contribute x(1 + ȡ), y(1 + ȡ), 0 x, y, 0 
Fig.4.4ThreeͲpersonvaluecapturinggameforsituation(b)
In situation (b), there are two Nash equilibriums found which are {not contribute, not
contribute, build} and {not contribute, not contribute, not build}. Similar to situation (a), value
capturing inthissituation isalso implausiblesincethetwoequilibriumsarefound inasituation in
whichallthelandownersshouldnotcontributetotheinfrastructuredevelopment.
Valuecapturingseemstobeimplausibleinalmostallsituationsshownabovebecause,with





thepayoffofchoosingnotcontributeforthe landownersothat it isbelowthepayoffforchoosing
contribute. The first option can be achieved by offering or taking into account any additional
incentivesorbenefits toa landowner forgivingup the incrementvalues to themunicipality.The
secondoptioncanbeachievedby introducingapenaltyora fine toa landownerwhenheorshe
choosesnotcontribute, in the situationwhen themunicipalitydecides tobuild the infrastructure.
Afterwards,thevalueofthepenaltyshouldbegiventothemunicipalityasanadditionalpayoff.
Let’s now analyse the games for these two options. First is with the introduction of
additionalincentivesforlandownerswhenchoosingcontribute.Supposetheadditionalincentiveto














Contribute x+ʌ, ȡx x, 0 







Contribute x+ʌ, ȡx x, 0 












Contribute x+ʌ, y+ʌ, ȡ(x + y) x, y, 0 
Not






Contribute x(1 + ȡ), y+ʌ, ȡy x, y, 0 
Not












Contribute (x+ʌ), (y+ʌ), ȡ(x + y) x, y, 0 
Not






Contribute x(1 + ȡ), (y+ʌ), ȡy x, y, 0 
Not








(b)wheretheNashequilibrium isnowshifting from {notcontribute,build}strategy to {contribute,






thatsuggests the implementationofvaluecapturingwithall landowners,and {notcontribute,not
contribute,notbuild}thatsuggestsnoimplementationofvaluecapturingatallandnoinfrastructure
development.
Now let’sanalysethegameswiththe introductionofapenaltyorafineto landownersfor
choosingnotcontribute.Supposethefineisdenotedbyʔwhichisgivenasacertainproportionof
thetotalvalueoflandandpropertiesaffectedbytheinfrastructuredevelopment.Itmeansthatifa
landowner refuses togiveacontribution to thedevelopmentof the infrastructure,heor shewill
receiveapayoffofx(1+ʌ)(1–ʔ),whileatthesametimethemunicipalitywillreceiveʔx(1+ʌ)asa
payoff. Inordertomakesurethatthe landowner’spayoff ishigherwhenheorshecontributesto
the infrastructure development after themunicipality decides to build it, the fine should satisfy
߮ ൐ ͳ െ ଵଵାఘ.
By introducingapenalty to landowners for choosingnot contributeafter themunicipality
decidestobuildtheinfrastructure,thedistinctionbetweensituation(a)and(b)becomesirrelevant.







Contribute x, ȡx x, 0 












Contribute x, y, ȡ(x + y) x, y, 0 
Not






Contribute x(1 + ȡ)(1 – ĳ), y, ĳx(1 + ȡ) + ȡy x, y, 0 
Not









ofvaluecapturing inthesesituations isnaturallytheonlystrategy forthestakeholderstochoose.
This result suggests that manipulation of the payoff structure might put forward the Nash
equilibriumtowardsthedesiredsolution.
4.4 Discussion:InvestigatingtheApplicabilityofGameTheory
As demonstrated in the previous section, gameͲtheoretical approaches can be used to
analysethe implementationofvaluecapturingandtocontributetoourunderstandingofcomplex
collectivedecisionmaking.Nonetheless,therealworldseemstobemuchmorecomplexthanthe
model abstraction in game theory as constructed in thispaper. In this section,we thereforewill
discuss the validity of gameͲtheoreticalmodelswe have introduced earlier by investigating how
usefulthesemodelsaretoexplainandunderstandabouttherealityofvaluecapturing.Inorderto
do so, first we will discuss about the specific (Dutch) institutional context within which value
capturing isapplied.Thiswill includeabriefdiscussionofthe landdevelopmentregimeandvalue
capturingmechanisms, specifically in theNetherlands.Secondly,wewilldiscuss the resultsof the
empirical testing of the models based on a survey among real estate professionals in the





reason,municipalities in theNetherlands frequently chooseapublic landdevelopmentapproach,
alsoknownasactive landpolicy.With thisapproach,municipalitiesactivelypurchaseall required
landtobedeveloped,readjusttheparcelsintobuildingplotssuitableforthedesireddevelopment,
service the land by providing necessary infrastructures and utilities, and after that release the
parcels tobuilders/developers andoccupiers (vanderKrabben&Needham,2008). Supportedby
subsidiesfromthecentralgovernment,thispracticehasnotonlymademunicipalitiestobeableto
steer landdevelopmentastheydesirebutalso ledtoapublicpredominance in landdevelopment
andservicedbuildingplotssupplies.
Inthe1980s,theNetherlandsencounteredahardeconomicrecessionthatforcedbothlocal
and national governments to cut their budgets which consequently has changed the role of
municipalitiesinlanddevelopment.Municipalitieshaveturnedtheirfocustoamorepassiveroleby
relying on law instruments including land use plans and building permits, to control land
development process. In contrast, private parties gradually have taken over the land market,
specifically in land supply,especially since the riseof thehousingmarketand increase inhousing
price in 1990s (Priemus & Louw, 2003). Since then, municipalities have experienced several
problems if theywant tomaintain theirambitions in landuse,whichare related to suchaspects








decreasing,municipalitieshave toworkout alternativeways to financepublic infrastructure and
utilitiesdevelopments.Valuecapturinghasbeen labelledasoneofpromisingmeans toovercome
thisproblem. In2001andalso in2004,theDutchnationalgovernment issuedamemorandumon
LandPolicywhich includedaconsideration tomake (better)useofvaluecapturing (VROM,2001;
2004;RVW,2004).However,thesucceedinggovernmenthadanegativeattitudetoitanduntilnow
there is no legal instrument in the Netherlands that specifically allows for value capturing.21
Conceivably,thereluctancetovaluecapturingisderivedfromthefactthatthegeneralsysteminthe
Netherlandshasconsideredthatthevalue increaseof landcausedbyanychangeoftheadmitted
landusefallstothe landowner,whichmeansthat landownershavearighttoenjoythe increment
value caused by public investments for themselveswithout any obligation to give it back to the
public(deWolff,2007;MunozGielen,2008).
In2008,DutchgovernmentintroducedanewSpatialPlanningAct(Wetruimtelijkeordening)
that enlarges the possibilities of public authorities to enforce private developer to contribute to
publicinfrastructureinvestment.Basedonthislegislation,privatepartiescanbeforced–iftheydo
not contribute voluntarily – to contribute to the financing of planͲrelated costs of publicworks.




Due to the lack of a specific legal instrument, it is essential (in the Dutch context) to
understandtheeffectsofadecisionofthepublicauthoritiesto implementvaluecapturingonthe
behaviourofprivateactorsand theconsequences for theprofitabilityof the investmentsbyboth
parties.GameͲtheoreticalmodelsthatareconstructed insection3haveprovidedsometheoretical





In this survey,we focusedon thedecisionbehaviourof landownerswith respect tovalue
capturing toobserve theirpreferences incontributing to the financingofpublic infrastructure,by




calculated the potential for value capturing in three Dutch station redevelopment projects,
illustratingtheamountofthe incrementvaluetobecontributedbythe landownerorcapturedby
themunicipality.Thelandownerhastwostrategies:tocontributeornottocontributetheincrement
                                                 
21  Actually, municipalities do have a legal instrument for value capturing (baatbelasting or profit tax), but 







respondentswere asked to reveal their preferences about their possible strategy by taking into

























#Contribute 15 5 3 4 23 22 22 22 37 37
% 38,5 12,8 7,7 10,3 59,0 56,4 56,4 56,4 94,9 94,9
#Notcontribute 24 34 36 35 16 17 17 17 2 2
% 61,5 87,2 92,3 89,7 41,0 43,6 43,6 43,6 5,1 5,1










development isdefinitelynot thebest strategicbehaviour for the landowners.The resultsof the
survey strongly confirm thiswith around90%of respondentsnot in favourof value capturing in
game2to4.
From the surveywealso found that forgame5 to10,mostof the respondentsprefer to
choosetocontribute,whichmeansthatvaluecapturingisplausibleinthecorrespondingsituations.
Recalling fromSection3,thesegamesarereflectingthesituations inwhichthepayoffstructure is
manipulated by two different kinds of interventions, namely by offering additional incentives or
benefitstoalandownerforgivinguptheincrementvaluestothemunicipality(ingame5to8)and
byintroducingapenaltyorafinetolandownerswhentheychoosenottocontribute(ingame9and
10). As discussed in Section 3, although game 5 to 8 suggest that the implementation of value
capturing is plausible in these corresponding situations, the strategy to contribute is not a pure
strategyforlandownerssincenottocontributecanalsobeconsideredastheirbeststrategy.Inthe
survey,we found for game 5 to 8 that the differences between the result of respondentswho
choosetocontributeornottocontributeareverysmallwithalmostequalpercentages,asshownin
table1.Meanwhile,theresultsofthesurveyforgame9and10showthatalmostallrespondents















taken simultaneously by all players but sequentially. Moreover, all gameͲtheoretical models
constructedabovearebasedonnonͲcooperativeapproaches.Problemshavebeenrecognizedfrom
thosemodelsespeciallywhen thegame consistsofmore than twoplayers. In those situations,a





whenplayersare interacting in sequence setting canbemodelledusinggames inextensive form




With respect to land and real estate development processes, the applications of game
theory so farare limited innumber (Berkman,1965;Batty,1977;Mu&Ma,2007).Nevertheless,
since the issues of pluriformity, complexity and interdependency have increased in many land
developmentprocess(Needham,2007),webelievethatgametheoryandgameͲtheoreticmodelling







much value can be captured?) (e.g. Benjamin & Sirmans, 1996; Debrezion et al., 2007; Hess &
Almeida, 2007), from a governance or instrumentalist point of view (which instruments can be
effectiveforvaluecapturing?)(e.g.Batt,2001;Gihring,2001;vanderKrabben&Needham,2008),
oreven fromapoliticalpointofview (towhombelongs the incrementvalue that is the resultof
government investments or decisions?) (e.g. Claydon & Smith, 1997; Fordham, 1989; Gielen &
TasanͲKok, 2010). The present paper emphasizes an alternative perspective to value capturing,
namely the decisionͲmaking or negotiation process underlying value capturing. Depending on,









respect to value capturing. By employing gameͲtheoretical models, this paper has been
demonstrated how this approach can be useful for such an analysis and can improve our
understandingaboutcollectivedecisionmakingproblemsintheimplementationofvaluecapturing.
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